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Advocates of antidumping (AD) laws downplay their effects by arguing that the trade 
flows that are subject to AD are small and their distortions negligible. This paper is the 
first to counter that notion by quantifying the worldwide effect of AD laws on aggregate 
trade flows. The recent  proliferation of  AD laws across  countries provides us with a 
natural  experiment  to  estimate  the  trade  effects  of  adopting  versus  using  AD  laws; 
differences  in  the  intensity  of  use  among  countries  with  older  AD  laws  allow  us  to 
investigate reputation effects. For this purpose, we estimate worldwide trade flows using 
a gravity equation spanning 21 years (1980-2000) of annual observations. Our estimates 
confirm that AD effects are not small.  Among other findings, new tough users have their 
aggregate imports depressed by 15.7 billion US$ a year (or 6.7%) as a result of the AD 
measures they have imposed. For a traditional user like the United States, current AD 
measures depress annual imports by  almost 20  billion US$ on top of the cumulative 
negative effect of reputation. For some countries, the dampening effects of AD laws on 
trade flows are found to nearly offset the gains from trade liberalization. 
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I. Introduction 
In line with the growing opposition to globalization forces, the sentiment surrounding 
antidumping (AD) laws seems to be more favorable now than ever before. Advocates of 
these laws argue that the amount of trade affected by AD laws is small, and their effects 
on aggregate trade flows negligible. Indeed, estimates have shown that the trade flows 
directly affected by AD protection are rather small and in the range of 2-5% (Hindley and 
Messerlin, 1996; Anderson, 1993). This paper is the first to counter this popular view and 
to document the fact that the global effects of AD laws on aggregate trade flows are 
substantial.  Our  results  demonstrate  than  when  countries  adopt  an  AD  law  into their 
national legislation, their total imports of commodities from all trade partners and in all 
goods -- not just the dumped products -- become seriously depressed in the years after 
adoption of the law, provided it is used frequently. Indeed, our results show that it is not 
so much the adoption of AD laws that depresses trade, but the actual enforcement of the 
law following the adoption. The number of AD measures and, to a lesser extent, the 
number of initiations have a significant trade-depressing effect. 
 
Many  countries  have  adopted  AD  laws  in  the  past  decade.  Zanardi  (2004a) 
documents that while 49 countries had an AD law in 1989, this number increased to 93 
countries by the end of 2000. This illustrates the extent of AD proliferation. Data from 
that  paper  can  then  be  used  to  construct  a  dataset  for  1980-2000  (a  period  featuring 
substantial variation in terms of countries adopting and using AD laws). This setting 
resembles a natural experiment to test whether the introduction of AD laws and their 
subsequent use has affected global shipments to the countries that adopted an AD law. 
Moreover,  the  heterogeneity  in  the  intensity  of  AD  use  in  countries  with  AD  laws 
adopted before 1980 can be used to investigate reputation effects stemming from the 
sustained use of the law. Accordingly, depending on the time of adoption of the AD law, 
we distinguish between ‘traditional users’ (i.e., countries that adopted it before 1980) and 
‘new  users’  (i.e.,  countries  that  adopted  it  after  1980).  Within  each  group,  a  further 
distinction is made between ‘tough’ and ‘weak’ users, depending on the extent of their 
enforcement (i.e., annual initiations and measures) of AD (see Table 1). 
 
Our dataset consists of trade flows from 121 exporting countries to 58 importing 
countries. The empirical analysis employs a gravity equation to investigate whether the 
adoption of an AD law and its use by importing countries affect aggregate (i.e., across   2  
sectors) global (i.e., on all bilateral flows) imports into the importing country. To date, 
studies on the trade effects of AD measures have had a more partial equilibrium flavor, in 
the sense that the trade effects under consideration were limited to the product(s) subject 
to AD investigations or measures. Most of these studies have indicated that imports from 
countries named in an AD case decreased as a result of AD protection, but this decrease 
is to a large extent offset by an increase in the imports from other countries, resulting in a 
relatively small net effect on total imports of a particular product. In contrast, this paper 
shows that AD laws and their implementation also strongly affect aggregate imports (i.e., 
they cause a substantial depressing effect on total imports). 
 
To summarize briefly, we find that the trade-depressing effects of AD are large 
for those countries that systematically use this protectionist tool. All of the new tough 
users  (i.e.,  Brazil,  India,  Mexico,  Taiwan  and  Turkey)  register  significant  negative 
impacts  of  AD,  with  the  largest  effects  reported  in  Mexico.  Annual  imports  in  that 
country are depressed by 7.4 billion US$, or 8.2%, compared to what they would have 
been in the absence of AD actions.
1 Overall, new tough users have their annual imports 
depressed by around 15.7 billion US$, or 6.7%, due to AD protection. Many new weak 
users did not impose any measure during the sample period. Among those who did use 
AD laws, China, Egypt and Venezuela registered the largest effects: their AD measures 
reduce their import flows by 5.5%, 3.1% and 3.1%, respectively. 
 
With respect to traditional users, we estimate two separate effects of AD on trade: 
a reputation effect and a direct effect. The distinction between traditional tough users and 
traditional  weak  users  allows  us  to  quantify  a  reputation  effect  accrued  through  the 
repetitive use of AD actions. A priori, such an effect is expected to be present for the 
traditional  tough  users  but  not  for  traditional  weak  users.  The  results  confirm  this 
hypothesis. In 2000, traditional tough users (i.e., Australia, Canada, EU, New Zealand 
and the US) experienced an extra trade loss over the previous period of 0.6%, or 9.5 
billion US$, for having an AD law in place for an extra year. Current AD measures by 
traditional  tough  users  also  depress  trade  on  top  of  the  reputation  effect.  The  AD 
measures they impose against all tough users result in an average trade loss of around 3% 
of their annual imports from other tough users, or 32 billion US$. The US bears the brunt 
                                                 
1 All monetary values in the paper are expressed in 1995 real prices.   3  
of this trade loss (i.e., 20 billion US$). In contrast, traditional weak users (see Table 2) 
show  little  evidence  of  a  reputation  effect,  although  their  current  AD  measures have 




These trade effects are quite large. Their relevance can be better appreciated when 
one considers that they refer to aggregate trade flows and not just to the 2-5% of trade 
flows directly affected by AD. In this sense, it is safe to say that AD has a substantial 
“chilling”  effect  on  imports.  For  some  countries,  moreover,  the  trade  losses  resulting 
from AD actions seriously offset the gains from trade liberalization. India is a prime 
example. It started liberalizing in 1991, which led to an 11.9% growth in its imports. 
Although India has had an AD law in place since 1985, it imposed its first AD measure in 
1993; the results of this paper imply that it experienced a 7.8% annual loss in imports as a 
result of AD actions. This confirms the notion that AD actions can substantially hinder 
the gains from trade liberalization -- in the case of India, lowering the overall gains from 
trade liberalization to only 4.1%. 
 
While this paper does not engage in welfare analysis, our  results suggest that 
existing studies underestimate the true welfare loss due to AD since they do not measure 
the aggregate trade-depressing effects. For example, Gallaway et al. (1999) use a CGE 
model  to  estimate  that  the  annual  welfare  loss  of  affirmative  AD  and  countervailing 
actions for the US are found to amount to 4 billion US$ a year.
3 This estimate, however, 
considers only the distortions due to the trade flows directly subject to AD measures. The 
US International Trade Commission (1995), DeVault (1996) and Anderson (1993) reach 
the same qualitative conclusions when analyzing specific US AD cases. Overall, the net 
effect of removing AD orders would greatly benefit the US economy, as AD duties result 
in a gain in producer welfare that is smaller than the loss to consumers. Although the 
existing literature focuses on the US, similar qualitative conclusions should hold for other 
AD users. However, our paper highlights the fact that also the distortions in aggregate 
trade flows, not just the trade flows that are subject to AD measures, should be taken into 
account when calculating welfare losses. 
                                                 
2 Such a wide variation is due to the substantial heterogeneity among the countries in this group. South 
Africa experiences the largest loss (i.e., 11.9% or 2.5 billion US$ a year). 
3 Countervailing duties are imposed on imports that receive illegal subsidies in their home country.   4  
It is important to distinguish our research question from recent work evaluating 
AD  laws  as  a  safety  valve.  The  “safety  valve”  is  a  popular  argument  used  by  AD 
advocates to defend their use. It argues that AD laws should be considered a ‘small price 
to pay’ since they enhance trade liberalization. While this may be true, this hypothesis 
still empirical verification.
4 The research question in this paper is different -- in the sense 
that we do not consider the relationship between AD laws and tariff concessions. Rather, 
we compare trade flows before and after the adoption of AD laws in importing countries, 
while at the same time controlling for their openness. The empirical analysis shows that 
while trade liberalization has resulted in significant growth of trade, AD actions seriously 
dampen this increase in imports in all new tough users.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
theoretical framework to explain the potential channels through which AD can reduce 
trade  flows,  and  serves  as  a  reference  for  the  empirical  analysis.  Section  III  briefly 
illustrates the AD phenomenon and presents our AD dataset. Section IV discusses the 
empirical methodology, and section V reports the results, the robustness checks and an 
evaluation of the economic significance of our findings. Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II. Channels through which antidumping can affect trade 
Instead of singling out  and presenting one particular theory, we discuss a number of 
different channels through which AD policy can affect trade flows. While some of these 
channels have already been well documented in the literature, others have received less 
exposure. In line with the partial equilibrium nature of these contributions, the empirical 
analyses of AD have always focused on the trade flows directly affected by AD laws. But 
since this paper takes a general equilibrium approach and analyzes the aggregate effects 
of AD, a mixture of effects and various theories may come into play. While some effects 
depend on the adoption of AD laws, others are derived from its use. 
 
First,  AD  protection  can  give  rise  to  trade  diversion.  This  implies  that  AD 
protection leads to a shift in trade for the country of origin. Many studies (see Prusa, 
2001; Konings et al., 2001; Niels, 2003) have documented cases in which an affirmative 
                                                 
4 Feinberg and Reynolds (2005) provide a first attempt in this direction by showing that countries that 
conceded larger tariff reductions at the Uruguay Round initiated relatively more AD cases later on.   5  
AD case against a named country results in depressed exports from that country to the 
benefit of exports from other non-named partners. Usually, the increased exports from 
non-named  countries  do  not  fully  offset  the  lost  exports  from  the  named  country. 
Therefore, net exports to the country imposing AD measures are likely to be smaller than 
they were before protection. Trade diversion studies are all carried out on products within 
the same sector. However, trade diversion may also occur in sectors not directly subject 
to AD duties because of a threatening effect. These spillover effects that may arise across 
products or sectors have not, however, been taken into account in the existing studies on 
trade diversion. Trade diversion leads us to expect a negative effect on aggregate exports 
to the countries imposing AD measures. 
 
Second, a number of papers have argued that in many cases, political and strategic 
considerations (in addition to economic motives) explain the use of AD laws. While the 
chief economic motive to adopt and use AD laws is to counter unfair trade, the strategic 
motive is related to retaliation, as shown by Blonigen and Bown (2003), Feinberg and 
Reynolds (forthcoming) and Prusa and Skeath (2002, 2004). In other words, the new 
generation of AD users today were the main targets of the tough users yesterday. This 
suggests  that  frequent  AD  actions  by  one  country  trigger  actions  by  other  countries 
previously  sighted  by  the  former.  This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1,  where  the  group  of 
historically tough users is the major target of AD actions today. This figure shows that 
traditional tough users mainly target other tough users of AD actions (supporting the 
retaliation  hypothesis).  It  also  shows  that  new  tough  users  use  AD  mainly  towards 
traditional tough users and other new tough users. As a result of this retaliation aspect, the 
more countries that adopt AD laws over time, the more we expect global trade to become 
depressed. On this point, Figure 2 illustrates the strong proliferation of AD laws over 
recent decades.  
 
Third, AD laws can involve reputation and learning effects. Trade partners are 
likely to be more prudent when shipping their exports to countries that have established 
themselves as frequent and tough users of AD. This is likely to result in higher prices or 
lower volumes  (in order to avoid dumping complaints). Thus, although AD cases by 
traditional tough users may be decreasing (as illustrated in Figure 3), this may not be due 
to less protection but may simply be a result of their reputation and the fact that their 
trade partners have learned to behave. Studies that ignore reputation effects are therefore   6  
probably  underestimating  the  true  depressing  effects  of  AD  on  exports  to  traditional 
tough users. 
 
Different types of learning may also come into play. A recent paper by Blonigen 
(forthcoming)  shows  that  the  probability  of  filing  an  AD  petition  within  a  particular 
sector depends largely on how many previous filings there have been in the same sector. 
This suggests that there is learning behavior on the side of the importing market: the more 
it has been involved in filing in the past, the more likely it is to use that past knowledge to 
file again in the future.  
 
Fourth, AD protection can give rise to AD jumping and inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Exporters may decide to set up a production plant within the protected 
market in order to avoid AD duties. This can be a profitable strategy, provided that the 
previously exporting firm has a firm-specific advantage that can be transferred across 
borders to overcome the fixed cost of setting up an extra plant, as shown theoretically by 
Belderbos et al. (2004) and Haaland and Wooton (1998). It should therefore hardly be 
surprising that predominantly Japanese firms have engaged in an AD jumping response, 
as shown empirically, among others, by Blonigen (2002) for the US and by Girma et al. 
(2002) for the UK. In this case, trade and FDI are substitutes. Therefore, AD-jumping 
FDI can have a trade-depressing effect. 
 
Fifth, several theoretical contributions have shown that AD protection can result 
in the formation of international cartels and tacit collusion (e.g. Messerlin, 1990; Prusa, 
1992; Veugelers and Vandenbussche, 1999; Zanardi, 2004b). This anticompetitive nature 
of AD laws may also depress trade. Our aggregate approach will encompass this effect on 
aggregate trade flows.  
 
Finally, a number of theoretical contributions have shown that the mere existence 
of AD laws can have trade-depressing effects even when no protection is enforced. This 
argument differs somewhat from the learning argument discussed above. It implies that as 
long as the probability of future protection is large enough, the threat of protection will 
depress trade (e.g., Ethier and Fischer, 1987; Pauwels et al., 2001). This theoretical result 
has important empirical implications because it suggests that the trade flows observed 
before the initiation of an AD case may differ from the trade flows that would materialize   7  
in  the  absence  of  AD  laws.  Related  arguments  have  been  made  in  the  literature  by 
Blonigen and Park (2004), Fischer (1992), Prusa (1994) and Staiger and Wolak (1989). 
 
This  paper  captures  world  trade  flows  by  including  all  bilateral  trade  flows 
between a large set of importing countries and a large set of exporting countries. This 
allows us to take into account country heterogeneity in trade diversion, spillover effects 
between products and also retaliation effects, reputation, learning effects and FDI effects. 
The sign of the net effect of AD on aggregate exports is difficult to predict. 
 
 
III. Antidumping law proliferation 
The recent proliferation of AD laws is illustrated in Figure 2. In 1904, Canada was the 
first country to adopt an AD law; almost a century later, in 2000, 93 countries had an AD 
law.
5 Figure 2 shows that especially the second half of the last century featured a strong 
increase in the number of countries adopting AD laws. Due to data limitations, however, 
only 58 of these countries are included as importers in the dataset, while 121 countries 
are present as exporters.
6 Table 2 lists all of the importers and the year in which they 
adopted the law. Even a casual look at this list illustrates the fact that AD has evolved 
from  an  instrument  of  protection  wielded  by  industrialized  countries  into  a  common 
protectionist tool available to a broad range of countries. 
 
The matrix in Table 1 summarizes the classifications used in this paper when 
distinguishing  countries  with  respect  to  their  AD  law  and  the  extent  of  their  use. 
Countries that adopted their AD law before the start of our dataset (i.e., before 1980) are 
labeled as traditional users while other countries are defined as new users. With respect 
to  the  second  dimension,  AD  users  are  tough  if  they  have  consistently  enforced  AD 
actions (i.e., initiations and measures), and weak otherwise. Therefore, what the literature 
generally defines as traditional users (i.e., Australia, Canada, EU, New Zealand and US) 
are called traditional tough users in this paper. Norway, in contrast, is an example of a 
traditional weak user, since it adopted an AD law in 1954 but never used it in the period 
of our analysis (and only rarely beforehand). Other countries in this group, like Argentina 
                                                 
5 The member countries of the EU are counted individually.  
6 The fact that the EU is included as a unitary importer and low-income countries (as defined by the World 
Bank in 2002 but with the exception of India since it is a heavy AD user) have been excluded, explains the   8  
and South Africa, have become very frequent users in recent years. This explains why in 
some studies they are considered new users (e.g., Prusa, 2001). In this paper, however, 
we make a clear distinction between those countries that adopted the law in the sample 
period (1980-2000) and those that had the law before.
7 
 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the number of AD initiations in the sample period 
by groups of users. While total initiations from traditional tough users show a negative 
trend, total initiations by new users are clearly increasing over time. The rise in global 
AD initiations during the sample period thus stems predominantly from the surge in AD 
activity from the group of countries that were basically absent in the 1980s. 
 
To quantify the net effect of AD laws on aggregate trade flows, we constructed a 
comprehensive and detailed dataset on the adoption and use of AD laws, from which the 
above figures and tables are derived. This dataset is highly disaggregated, since it records 
with annual frequency the number of AD initiations and measures of each country against 
each exporter over the period 1980-2000. Moreover, it is not limited to GATT/WTO 
countries, and has been compiled from a variety of sources in order to overcome the 
limitations  of  each  given  source.  In  this  sense,  it  is  the  most  comprehensive  dataset 
available on AD.
8 The cross-country and time series variations in AD law adoption and 
use are the building blocs for this paper. The panel structure of the dataset allows us to 
identify the net effect of AD on aggregate trade flows. 
 
 
IV. Empirical methodology and data 
The challenge of measuring the aggregate effects of AD is illustrated by the channels 
discussed in Section III. The versatility of the gravity equation offers a feasible solution 
to this problem. In its basic form, the gravity equation postulates that trade between two 
countries is determined by their relative size and the distance between them. While trade 
flows  tend  to  increase  with  country  size,  they  decrease  with  distance.  The  gravity 
equation has been widely employed in international trade since its first use in the 1960s. 
                                                                                                                                                   
reduction in the number of importing countries. See the Appendix for a list of countries. 
7 In the robustness section, we modify our definition of new tough users to include Argentina, South Africa, 
and South Korea, all of which adopted AD laws long before 1980 but recently became frequent users. 
8 See Zanardi (2004a) for more details and a broader overview of the global use of AD in 1980-2000. The 
AD dataset by Bown (2005) contains more details, but a narrower coverage in terms of countries and years.   9  
Its  initial  success  was  due  to  the  remarkably  good  fit  that  it  delivers  in  empirical 
applications;  its  use  was  often  criticized,  however,  for  the  lack  of  theoretical 
underpinnings. This initial situation has been reversed. Starting from Anderson (1979), it 
has been shown that various theoretical models deliver a reduced-form equation like the 
gravity  equation  so  that  Frankel  (1998,  page  2)  concludes  that  it  has  “gone  from  an 
embarrassment of poverty of theoretical foundations to an embarrassment of riches.”
9 
Theoretically  founded  and  empirically  successful,  the  gravity  equation  has  been 
employed  extensively to investigate the effects of borders, regional trade agreements, 
monetary unions, common languages, and various other institutional settings on trade 
flows. 
 
Our empirical approach consists of applying a gravity equation and augmenting it 
with AD variables. In particular, we estimate the following gravity equation: 
 
ln(exportsijt  i j + U ln(exportsijt-1  AD adoptionjt + G ln(AD usejt) +  
1 ln(GDPit 2 ln(GDPjt 3 ln(populationit) +  
4 ln(populationjt 5 ln(distanceij 6 borderij 7 languageij +           (1) 
8 colonyij 9 ln(RERijt 10 WTOjt 11 RTAijt +  
12 ln(openness indexjt) \HDUGXPPLHV ijt 
 
where the dependent variable is the natural log of the real value of exports from country i 
to country j in period t. Econometrically, we estimate a dynamic model by including the 
lagged value of the real exports, as it has been shown that lagged levels of trade affect 
current trade (Bun and Klaassen, 2002; De Grauwe and Skudelny, 2000; Eichengreen and 
Irwin,  1997).  Eichengreen  and  Irwin  (1997)  clearly  demonstrate  the  importance  of 
historical factors on current trade decisions and advocated “never [to] run another gravity 
equation that excludes lagged trade flows.” We cannot estimate (1) with OLS, since the 
possibility of serial correlation in the exports series implies that a least-squares estimation 
of (1) would result in inconsistent estimates. We therefore use an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach, where lagged exports are instrumented with exports lagged by two periods 
(i.e., Tables 3, 4 and 6).
10 For robustness, we also report (i.e., Table 5) the estimates 
                                                 
9 See Evenett and Keller (2002) for a review of the theoretical foundations of the gravity equation and its 
usefulness in testing alternative models of trade. 
10 Since the serial correlation can be of a higher order than just the first order, we also experimented with   10  
obtained  when  using  the  system  generalized  method  of  moments  (GMM)  estimator 
proposed  by  Arellano  and  Bover  (AB,  1995),  where  we  allow  the  lagged  dependent 
variable and other regressors in (1) to be endogenous. The system AB estimator improves 
upon the standard differenced AB estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) in the case of 
persistent time series, which is our case for trade and gross domestic product (GDP). The 
AB estimator imposes further statistical restrictions, however, and a serious downside is 
that  in  its  use  all  time  invariant  variables  are  dropped  (since  it  is  based  on  first 
differences). 
 
Along with the usual set of variables that enter the gravity equation (and that will 
be discussed below), the focus of this paper is on the AD variables in specification (1).
11 
First, a dummy variable (AD adoption) takes a value of 1 if an importing country has an 
AD  law  in  a  given  year.  This  dummy  varies  over  time  only  for  the  new  users;  this 
provides us with a natural experiment, since their global trade flows before and after the 
adoption of the AD law are included in the dataset. Second, a variable capturing the use 
of AD (AD use) is included. We have information on the number of AD initiations and 
measures that were imposed in each year from each importing country against its trade 
partners. However, the inclusion of these regressors may lead to an endogeneity problem, 
since AD initiations or measures in a given year against a particular country are likely to 
be a function of the imports from that country. We thus use the total number of AD 
initiations and the total number of AD measures that any particular importer imposes 
against all other countries worldwide in a particular year. From an economics point of 
view, we can justify the use of the total number of initiations and measures by the fact 
that the use of AD against some trade partners can be regarded as a warning to other trade 
partners. Furthermore, the total number of initiations is lagged by one year, since the 
effect of AD initiations on aggregate trade flows may take some time to materialize -- 
thereby reducing even further the possible endogeneity. The total number of measures is 
not lagged, however, since there is a substantial time gap between the initiation of a case 
and the final decision on AD measures, making this variable also less likely to suffer 
from an endogeneity problem. For traditional users, the age of their AD law is included 
(instead of the AD dummy) and taken as a proxy of reputation effects. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
exports lagged by more than two periods. The results do not change and are not reported, to save on space. 
11 A detailed description of all variables and their sources is provided in the Appendix.   11  
The  other  regressors  in  equation  (1)  are  standard  for  a  gravity  equation.  The 
importing country’s GDP controls for demand aspects, while the exporter’s GDP controls 
for supply  effects. Populations are expected to  enter with positive signs (since larger 
countries generally trade more), while the distance between the trading pair impairs the 
flow of goods and should have a negative coefficient. The dummy variable for countries 
sharing a border is expected to have a positive coefficient (since neighboring countries 
trade more). Similarly, common language and colonial ties should positively affect trade. 
Given the long span of the sample and the large set of countries, the only feasible way to 
control  for  price  changes  is  to  introduce,  similarly  to  Rose  (2000),  the  bilateral  real 
exchange rate (RER), which is expected to have a negative sign (since a depreciation of 
the importing country’s currency should reduce its imports). Year dummies control for 
any  time  variation  common  to  all  trade  relationships  (e.g.,  business  cycle  effects, 
globalization trends, etc.). ImSRUWHU jDQGH[SRUWHUIL[HGHIIHFWV i) address the critique 
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) on the use of the gravity equation.
12 
 
Another set of regressors is used to control for trade policy aspects. The WTO 
dummy variable takes  a value of 1 if a country  is  a member of the  WTO (formerly 
GATT). The inclusion of this variable is motivated by the close relationship between 
membership  of  the  GATT/WTO  and  adoption  of  AD  laws  (see  Figure  2),  and  this 
relationship is investigated further in the robustness section. Regional trade agreements 
should have a positive impact on trade if both trading partners are members (and the 
dummy variable RTA should provide evidence in this regard).
13 In order to isolate the 
effects of AD from the other trade policy instruments, we need a time varying control for 
the stance of the trade policy in each country. It is inherently difficult, however, to find a 
measure of trade policy that is available for many countries over a long period of time. 
Considering  the  trade-off  between  cross-country  and  time  dimension,  we  use  the 
‘Freedom  to  Trade  with  Foreigners’  index  (openness  index)  published  by  the  Fraser 
Institute (Canada). This is a composite index of data on tariffs, regulatory trade barriers, 
exchange rate policies and international capital market controls.
14 It varies between zero 
and ten, with higher values indicating more open countries. 
                                                 
12 While the correction proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is cumbersome to incorporate, 
Feenstra  (2002)  argues  that  importer  and  exporter  fixed  effects  provide  a  simpler  way  to  address  the 
problem. 
13 Various regional trade agreements may have quantitatively different effects on trade among members. 
Since the focus of the paper is on AD, such differences are not specifically addressed.   12  
V. Discussion of results 
V.1. Natural experiment: does the adoption of an AD law depress global trade? 
Arguably, if there is a worldwide effect of AD laws, it should manifest itself when an 
importing country switches from not having an AD law to adopting and frequently using 
such a law. To verify this, we estimate the specification in (1) allowing for differential 
effects on different groups of importers. Initially, we include only new users as importers, 
and  all  available  countries  as  exporters.  The  IV  results  are  reported  in  the  first  two 
columns of Table 3. The lagged number of total AD initiations is used in column (1), 
while this variable is replaced by the total number of AD measures in column (2). While 
the other regressors will be discussed later, we first focus on the AD variables. 
 
The results in Table 3 show that the AD adoption dummy is not significant, and 
that the number of AD initiations in column (1) and the number of AD measures in 
column (2) have negative and significant effects on trade flows. At first, an insignificant 
AD dummy could be expected in a regression in which the group of importers includes 
both countries that never or rarely used their AD law as well as heavy users of AD. In this 
sense, the dummy variable may not be able to distinguish between the different uses of 
the law by new users. As for the variables capturing AD actions, the number of measures 
has a stronger effect in depressing trade than the number of initiations. This suggests that 
although  the  overall  number  of  initiations  depresses  trade,  it  is  the  extent  of  actual 
enforcement of AD duties that depresses trade the most. 
 
While some new users have used their AD law rarely, others (i.e., new tough 
users) have used them frequently. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, the AD regressors 
are interacted with a dummy variable distinguishing the group of new weak users from 
the group of new tough users. The AD adoption dummy is marginally significant and 
positive for the new weak users and not significant for the new tough users. Overall, this 
result confirms that adoption of an AD law does not affect trade. Interestingly, also the 
AD  initiations  lose  their  significance.  This  may  be  due  to  the  reduced  variance  that 
remains in each group (once allowance is made for different effects). However, column 
(4) shows that the enforcement of AD measures has clear negative effects on trade flows, 
especially for new tough users, while for the new weak users the effect is smaller and 
                                                                                                                                                   
14 See Gwartney and Lawson (2003) for more details on the index.   13  
only significant at 10%. The difference between weak and tough new users can no doubt 
be traced to the fact that the former countries  did not use AD enough to discourage 
exports  or  that  the  negative  impact  of  AD  is  confined  to  the  specific  goods  under 
investigation. Overall, the results in columns (1) and (2) seem to be driven by the AD 
activity of the new tough users. These results suggest that the decision ‘to adopt or not to 
adopt an AD law’ does not have an impact on trade. But what is highly significant is the 
number of AD measures that a country imposes. 
 
Figure  1  shows  that  most  of  the  AD  initiations  by  traditional  tough  users  are 
directed towards other tough users and also that most of the AD initiations by new tough 
users  are  directed  towards  other  tough  users  of  AD.  To  investigate  this,  we  run  an 
experiment in the last two columns of Table 3 (where only tough users are included as 
exporters)  to  see  whether  the  adoption  of  AD  laws  and  their  use  by  new  users 
significantly affect exports from the most targeted trade partners. A priori, it is not clear 
what to expect. Although these exporters are the ones most intensively targeted by the 
new users of AD, the size of the traditional tough users among them may make their 
exporters (and the overall export levels) less sensitive to AD actions from new users 
(since they are smaller in economic terms). Columns (5) and (6) show that, as before, the 
AD adoption dummy is not significant, and that AD measures depress overall exports 
from all other tough users. The point estimate for AD measures is actually smaller for this 
restricted set of exporters (i.e., -0.023 in column (6) versus -0.039 in the fourth column), 
which  is  consistent  with  the  idea  that  large  exporters  suffer  less  from  AD  actions 
(although they are heavily targeted). 
 
The other variables in the gravity equation present the expected sign, and their 
significance is in line with the results obtained in other gravity studies. In particular, 
lagged exports are always highly significant -- confirming that the exports series are quite 
persistent  over  time.  Distance  always  has  a  negative  and  significant  coefficient  -- 
confirming the well-known result that the further away the importing country is from the 
exporting country, the smaller the trade that flows between them. The openness index is 
always positive and significant, suggesting that the more open the importing country is, 
the  higher  the  worldwide  exports  that  flow  towards  that  country.  The  GDP  of  the 
importing country is positive and has a significant effect on the total exports directed 
towards the importing country. In contrast, the GDP level of the exporting country does   14  
not have much explanatory power. In terms of population, the results tend to differ across 
specifications. A possible explanation for the mixed results for GDP and population may 
be the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable that takes over the size effect.  
 
Common border, common language and colonial ties are important explanatory 
variables  in  most  specifications  of  Table  3,  as  has  already  been  established  in  the 
literature. The real exchange rate shows the expected negative sign in most specifications. 
Belonging  to  the  same  regional  trade  agreement  has  a  positive  effect,  as  does 
GATT/WTO membership. Whereas the WTO dummy is positive and significant in the 




In sum, Table 3 shows that trade depression is mainly caused by the extent to 
which an importing country uses AD against trade partners and not by whether or not that 
country has an AD law. To put it differently, in a cross-section of countries where some 
have an AD law while others do not, the mere existence of the law is not a critical factor 
in explaining the overall level of exports directed towards that country. What is critical is 
the extent to which importing countries take action when they have an AD law in place. 
And  even  in  this  case,  trade  is  not  depressed  merely  because  a  country  initiates  AD 
petitions; rather, the extent of final affirmative findings affects trade flows. 
 
 
V.2. Traditional users and reputation effects  
So far, we have not explicitly examined the effects of the AD laws on traditional users 
(since we do not observe the magnitude of their trade flows before the introduction of 
their AD law). For traditional users, trade may therefore be depressed throughout our 
period of analysis compared to what it would have been in the absence of AD laws -- but 
we cannot test for this in the same way as we can for the new users. 
 
As an alternative, the age of the AD law of traditional users is taken as a proxy of 
a potential reputation effect. The hypothesis is that the longer a country has had an AD 
                                                 
15  Our  methodology  of  importer  and  exporter  fixed  effects  and  exports  (instead  of  total  trade)  as  the 
dependent  variable  is  very  close  to  Subramanian  and  Wei  (2005),  who  also  find  a  positive  effect  of 
GATT/WTO membership. Rose (2004) uses a different approach and does not find a significant effect.   15  
law, the more likely it will be that it has established a reputation through its use. Table 4 
reports the IV results where (1) is estimated by restricting importers either to traditional 
tough users or to traditional weak users and where the AD adoption dummy is replaced 
by the age of the AD law. This regressor should not be significant for traditional weak 
users, since these countries never or rarely used AD. Instead, there should be evidence of 
a reputation effect for traditional tough users. In other words, the age variable should be 
negative and significant if a negative reputation effect is at work, suggesting that the 
longer an AD law exists, the higher will be the trade-depressing effect. 
 
The first two columns of Table 4 analyze all exports to traditional tough users. In 
contrast, columns (3) and (4) feature exports only to tough users (in view of the fact that 
AD  actions  by  the  traditional  tough  users  are  mainly  targeting  other  tough  users,  as 
illustrated in Figure 1). Finally, the last two columns consider all export flows going to 
traditional weak users. Note that in all these regressions the WTO dummy is dropped 
(since all traditional users joined the GATT/WTO before the start of our sample period). 
 
The empirical findings presented in Table 4 confirm our hypothesis regarding the 
age variable. In columns (1) to (4), where importers are traditional tough users, the AD 
age  is  statistically  significant  and  negative.  In  contrast,  in  analyses  of  trade  flows  to 
traditional weak users, the age variable is not significant. 
 
Regarding  the  actual  use  of  AD,  initiations  are  not  a  significant  factor  in 
depressing trade -- at least not on the overall imports of traditional tough users. Instead, 
they do seem to depress imports to the traditional weak users. In terms of AD measures, 
there is a negative effect for trade flows between tough users of AD, as indicated by the 
coefficient on AD measures in column (4). Also for trade flowing to traditional weak 
users, AD measures have a significant trade-depressing effect. Interestingly, the trade-
depressing effect of one additional measure for a traditional weak user of AD seems 
greater than the trade-depressing effect of one additional measure for a traditional tough 
user (i.e., see coefficients on total AD measures in columns (6) and (4)). This result is 
consistent with the different effect of the age variable in the two specifications, and it has 
a natural interpretation. For a traditional user of AD that has established its status as a 
tough user, trade is depressed mostly because of reputation. Then, one additional measure 
is going to have less of an effect on trade than for a weak user that hardly ever uses AD.   16  
When a traditional weak user takes AD action (initiations or measures), it surprises trade 
partners and thus generates a larger negative response. 
 
In terms of the other regressors, some changes can be noted relative to the results 
in Table 3. The explanation lies in the limited set of importers. The border dummy is no 
longer significant, possibly because the most important trade partners of traditional tough 
users are not bordering countries. For example, the US is the most important importer of 
EU products (and vice versa), whereas the countries bordering the EU, like the Eastern 
European  countries,  import  only  a  very  small  share  of  EU  total  exports.  A  similar 
argument holds for traditional weak users, since some of these countries do not have land 
borders  (e.g.,  Barbados,  Cyprus,  Jamaica,  Japan).  The  same  explanation  can  be  put 
forward for the negative or insignificant sign on the common language variable. Colonial 
ties continue to be important in explaining total world exports to traditional tough users, 
but not to traditional weak users. The openness index is not significant -- perhaps because 
it does not vary that much for traditional users, which were already relatively quite open 
(especially tough users) at the beginning of the sample.  
 
 
V.3. Robustness and sensitivity checks 
In view of the potential endogeneity of a number of variables in (1), we now turn to the 
Arellano and Bover (AB) system GMM approach, where lagged exports, GDPs and total 
AD measures are treated as endogenous.
 The GMM method may use all available lags of 
the variables from t-2 onwards as instruments. Our time dimension is quite long, and we 
limit the number of lags to ten.
16 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the AB estimates. The first three columns can be 
compared to Table 3 (which investigates the trade effects of the adoption and use of AD 
laws by new users), while the last three columns serve as a robustness check of Table 4 
(which focuses on the reputation effect for traditional users. 
 
The conclusions with respect to the new users do not change. Again, the adoption 
dummy is not significant, while the number of AD measures is highly significant and 
                                                 
16 The choice of the number of lags is not particularly inspired by economic reasons, although from an 
econometric point of view ten lags is generally regarded as a high number of instruments.    17  
negative.
17  The  point  estimates  are  actually  higher  than  those  in  Table  3,  and  are 
significant for both types of new users. However, the test statistics reported at the bottom 
of Table 4 suggest the presence of second-order autocorrelation. Moreover, the Hansen 
test of overidentifying restrictions is rejected, and the same holds even with a smaller 
number  of  lags  for  the  instruments.  This  may  be  due  to  the  heterogeneous  set  of 
importers. When restricting the set of importers to the more homogenous set of traditional 
users (i.e., the last three columns of Table 5), the Hansen test is always satisfied.
18  
 
For  traditional  tough  users,  the  AD  age  presents  a  negative  and  significant 
coefficient  (i.e.,  columns  (4)  and  (5)).  As  in  Table  4,  AD  measures  have  a  trade-
depressing effect on imports -- but only on imports coming from other tough AD users. 
The AB results for traditional weak users are reported in the last column of Table 5. The 
AD age variable is now positive and significant, suggesting that no reputation has been 
accrued  by  these  weak  users.  The  AD  measures  are  highly  significant  and  negative, 
confirming that AD measures undertaken by a traditional weak user depress its imports. 
 
Finally, two sensitivity checks relate to the group of new users. First, Figure 2 
shows  a  close  relationship  between  adoption  of  an  AD  law  and  GATT/WTO 
membership. Although the AD dummy is never significant, its true effect may be masked 
by the WTO dummy. Therefore, the first column of Table 6 reports the results for the 
same  specification  as  in  column  (4)  of  Table  3,  but  drops  the  WTO  dummy  (the 
correlation between AD adoption and WTO membership is 0.41). The qualitative results 
on  the  trade-depressing  effects  of  AD  laws  are  unchanged  (thus  excluding  any 
misinterpretation of the AD dummy, which is still insignificant). 
 
Second, different definitions of new tough users are tested. One possibility is to 
define them based on the number of AD investigations initiated per year (see column (4) 
in Table 2). Selecting those countries that adopted the AD law at some point during our 
sample  period  and  that  initiated  at  least  four  AD  cases  on  average  per  year,  this 
alternative definition of new tough users encompasses the original five countries (i.e., 
Brazil, Mexico, India, Taiwan and Turkey) plus China, Egypt, Indonesia, Lithuania and 
Poland. Column (2) of Table 6 shows the estimates when using this definition of new 
                                                 
17 The results for AD initiations are very similar and available upon request. 
18 By homogeneous, we mean countries with similar size, level of development and trade flows.   18  
tough users. In this case, AD measures have a trade-depressing effect on the worldwide 
imports of all new users, irrespective of whether AD measures are interacted with weak 
or  tough  users.  With  respect  to  Table  3,  the  estimate  for  new  weak  users  is  more 
significant and even larger (in absolute value) than the one for new tough users, although 
the two coefficients are not statistically different. Moreover, the result on the new tough 
users becomes somewhat smaller compared to the case with the original definition of new 
tough users. This finding can be explained by noting that AD measures have less of a 
trade-depressing effect for new weak users when China (whose growth in trade over time 
has  been  phenomenal)  is  included  among  them.  Likewise,  the  inclusion  of  China 
mitigates the trade-depressing effects of AD measures for new tough users when it is 
classified as such (i.e., column (2) of Table 6).   
 
Yet another alternative definition of new tough users can be based on the number 
of AD initiations per US$ of imports (see column (5) of Table 2). In this case, new tough 
users are defined as those countries that adopted an AD law during our sample and have 
an  AD  intensity  larger  than  300.
19  Accordingly,  Brazil,  Columbia,  Egypt,  India, 
Lithuania, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey and Venezuela are now labeled 
as new tough users. While these are relatively small countries with few AD initiations, 
their AD intensities are quite large because of their relatively low import values. The 
estimates  using  this  definition  are  presented  in  column  (3)  of  Table  6.  Our  earlier 
conclusions are reinforced -- in the sense that the AD measures imposed by these new 
tough users clearly reduce trade flows, while imports of the remaining new weak users do 
not exhibit any effect for the AD measures they impose. 
 
As a final check, the last column of Table 6 identifies new tough users as the 
original five plus three countries (i.e., Argentina, South Africa and South Korea) that 
adopted an AD law before 1980 and have been quite active in the use of AD during our 
sample period. Qualitatively, the estimates are identical to the results in column (4) of 
Table 3, although the point estimate for the AD measures is much larger because of the 
high number of AD measures imposed by the additional three countries. 
 
                                                 
19 This index, introduced by Finger et al. (2002), has received special attention ever since. The index takes 
the US as the benchmark and sets it equal to 100. Therefore, these countries initiated at least three times as 
many investigations per US$ of imports as the US.   19  
In conclusion, the AB analysis confirms the robustness of the results presented 
earlier,  suggesting  that  AD  measures  have  a  significant  trade-depressing  effect  on 
aggregate imports. The evidence of a reputation effect for traditional tough users is also 
confirmed.  Although  alternative  definitions  of  new  tough  users  serve  to  illustrate 
differences across groups of users, they do not change the conclusion that the use of AD 
measures hinders global trade flows into new (tough) users of AD.  
 
 
V.4. Economic significance 
The estimated coefficients from the previous section can be used in an attempt to put a 
dollar value on the extent to which trade flows are depressed as a result of AD laws. 
 
Using the coefficient in column (4) of Table 3, together with the fact that new 
tough users impose on average five AD measures a year after adoption of the AD law, we 
conclude that the annual reduction of global imports to the new tough users is 6.7%.
20 
Using average values of total annual imports to new tough users from 1995-2000, this 
percentage implies that annual imports to new tough users are depressed by around 15.7 
billion US$ (in 1995 prices). Table 7 reports detailed figures for each of the new tough 
users, and discloses a large heterogeneity. For example, Mexico’s AD caseload leads to a 
8.2% reduction in imports, while Taiwan’s AD actions imply only a 2.7% reduction. 
 
As for the new weak users, many of these countries did not impose any measure 
during the sample period. Table 7 shows the trade-depressing effects of AD for China, 
Egypt and Venezuela, which are the most active countries in this group (i.e., on average 
at least two AD measures during the sample). Their AD measures lead to a reduction of 
their imports in the order of 5.5%, 3.1% and 3.1%, respectively. 
 
In order to put these numbers into perspective, it is worth comparing them with 
the trade gains accomplished during the same period as a result of trade liberalization. 
Toward this end, we exploit the fact that the openness index is always positive and highly 
significant in the regressions for new users. We then calculate the gains in trade due to 
                                                 










, since the regressor takes the form of 
ln(1+AD measuresjt). In what follows, similar calculations are used.   20  
trade liberalization by using the change in the openness index for the years from the 
beginning of their trade liberalization process until the end of the sample period.
21 For 
instance, Mexico’s trade liberalization began essentially in 1985. A calculation based on 
the  change  of  Mexico’s  openness  index  from  1985  up  to  2000  shows an  increase  in 
imports of 18.9% over this period.
22 Interestingly, Mexico first imposed an AD measure 
in 1987, and its AD policy resulted in trade losses of 8.2%, thereby undoing an important 
part of what had been accomplished with the liberalization reforms. Other new tough 
users also face similar situations; India, in particular, eliminated most of its gains from 
liberalization.
23 It is interesting to note that for most of the new tough users, the AD 
measures  that  were  first  imposed  occur  during  the  liberalization  period,  possibly 
suggesting that AD may function as a safety valve. But when we compare the percentage 
loss in imports due to AD measures and the gains in imports due to trade liberalization, 
the true chilling effects of AD are both apparent and too large to be dismissed as a ‘small 
price  to  pay  for  further  trade  liberalization’.  The  situations  of  the  new  weak  users 
reported in Table 7 are very similar, with the trade gains for Venezuela being essentially 
cancelled out by the country’s use of AD. 
 
Table  7  also  shows  similar  calculations  for  three  countries  that  are  often 
considered as new users of AD because they became active users in recent years (while in 
fact they all adopted AD laws well before the 1980s): Argentina, South Africa and South 
Korea. The effects of AD measures are substantial. In fact, except for Argentina, the 
trade-depressing effects of AD measures are larger than the benefits of trade reforms. 
However, it is important to recognize that both South Africa and South Korea already had 
quite high trade indices before the liberalization process. 
 
When  quantifying  the  trade-depressing  effects  of  AD  for  traditional  users,  we 
must distinguish between direct and indirect effects. First, the indirect effect is due to 
reputation and is measured through the AD age variable, which is highly significant for 
traditional tough users (i.e., Table 4). This reputation effect suggests that imports each 
                                                 
21 Trade liberalization dates from Jonsson and Subramanian (2001), Li (2004), Liu (2002) and Refaat 
(2000). 
22 Trade gains as a result of liberalization are calculated as  %, 9 . 18
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where 7.85 and 4.28 are 
the values of the openness index in 2000 and 1985, respectively. 
23 According to Table 7, also Taiwan neutralized most of the gains. However, in 1986 its openness index 
was very high already (i.e., 7.12 out of 10).   21  
year are depressed as a result of the reputation that these countries have built regarding 
the use of AD. This effect is independent of the current use of AD but depends on past 
behavior. For the last year in our sample period (i.e., 2000), the average age of AD laws 
in traditional tough users is 76 years. Therefore, considering the coefficient from column 
(1)  in  Table  4  (i.e.,  -0.487),  it  follows  that  in  2000  the  existence  of  the  AD  regime 
depressed total imports into traditional tough users by an extra 0.6%, compared to the 
previous  year.  Although  this  percentage  seems  small,  it  is  worth  emphasizing  that  it 
represents only the extra one-year depressing effect of AD policy over the previous year 
due to the reputation of these users. Since the average aggregate imports in the traditional 
tough users in recent years (i.e., 1995-2000) amounted to 1,540 billion US$, this trade-
depressing effect amounts to 9.5 billion US$. 
 
Second, the current use of AD measures seems to have a trade-depressing effect 
for the imports of traditional tough users from other tough users. Based on the coefficient 
in column (4) of Table 4 (i.e., –0.017, albeit significant only at the 10% level), annual 
exports from (traditional and new) tough users to traditional tough users are 32 billion 
US$ lower than they would have been in the absence of AD actions by the traditional 
tough users. Together, indirect and direct AD effects have a total trade depression on the 
imports  of  all  traditional  tough  users  of  41.5  billion  US$.  Of  course,  there  is  some 
heterogeneity amongst the traditional tough users. For example, when focusing on the US 
and the EU, our estimates show that the direct effect of AD measures result in an annual 
depression of 20 and 5.5 billion US$, respectively. As for the reputation effect, the extra 




In contrast, there is no evidence of a reputation effect for traditional weak users 
(i.e.,  the  AD  age  is  not  significant  in  columns  (5)  and  (6)  of  Table  4),  but  they  do 
experience the trade depressing effects of current AD measures. As a result of the large 
heterogeneity among the countries in this group, trade depression varies between zero and 
11.9%. Table 7 shows the figures for the three most active users in this group. South 
Africa tops the list with a reduction in trade of 11.9%, or 2.5 billion US$. Argentina and 
South Korea track it closely with losses of 10.5% (2.3 billion US$) and 6.4% (6.5 billion 
                                                 
24 The different import values for these two countries explain why these last two figures are so similar, 
while the age of the AD law in these countries is very different.   22  
US$), respectively.  
 
Overall,  these  numbers  illustrate  the  chilling  effects  that  AD  policy  can  have 
(since they measure the depressing effects on aggregate trade flows when, instead, the 
share of trade directly affected by AD actions is on average in the range of 2 to 5%). This 
observation, together with the evidence on the proliferation of AD regimes, should sound 
an alarm in opposition to the rhetoric asserting that the effects of AD protection are small 
and insignificant. Although these calculations refer to the short-run effects, our dynamic 






This paper shows that AD laws can have trade-depressing effects worldwide. This study 
thus complements the existing literature that has examined the trade effects of AD in a 
partial equilibrium framework. 
 
The fact that many countries have adopted AD laws in recent years provides us 
with a natural experiment in time to study worldwide trade flows towards these new users 
before and after the adoption of AD laws. To exploit this time variation, we constructed a 
detailed dataset that includes information on both the date of AD law adoption as well as 
various variables capturing the use of AD laws. Based on a panel data analysis with time- 
and cross-country variation, our results from an augmented gravity equation show that 
what depresses exports is not so much the adoption of AD laws but the extent to which 
AD measures are used to punish exporters. Although we do not observe the situation of 
traditional  users  before  the  adoption  of  the  AD  law,  our  analysis  still  allows  us  to 
conclude that the AD regimes of these countries harm trade flows. We thus establish the 
presence of a reputation effect for those traditional users that have made frequent use of 
AD (i.e., traditional tough users), while there is no such evidence for traditional users that 
rarely used it (i.e., traditional weak users). The current AD caseload, however, always 
depresses trade in traditional weak users, and some evidence suggests that it also reduces 
imports for traditional tough users for those imports coming from all tough users. 
                                                 
25 We refrain from calculating the long-run effects since the results for traditional tough users confirm the 
emergence of reputation effects that take over the direct effect of individual AD actions.    23  
The results presented here refute the notion that AD is merely a small price to 
pay. They clearly indicate that the trade-depressing effects of AD on worldwide trade are 
non-negligible. The new tough users of AD laws have their annual imports reduced by 
around 6.7%, which corresponds to 15.7 billion US$ -- all because of their AD measures. 
Among the new weak users, China, Egypt and Venezuela also register significant losses 
in a range from 3.1 to 5.5%. The AD policy of traditional tough users depresses their 
annual imports from other tough users by around 41.5 billion US$. Although comparable 
figures for traditional weak users vary quite a bit because of the heterogeneity of these 
countries, they still amount to large shares for some of these users. For example, both 
Argentina and South Africa register annual losses in excess of 10% of their total imports. 
 
Overall, it is clear that the trade-depressing effects of AD are not confined only to 
the specific goods subject to AD measures (since the effects on aggregate flows are non-
negligible and provide an overall chilling effect). This conclusion is reinforced when the 
size of the diminished trade flows is compared to the changes due to trade liberalization 
(approximated by the change in the openness index). When the trade losses are compared 
to the trade gains achieved through trade reforms, our results confirm that the “benefits 
from  trade  liberalization  have  been  considerably  neutralized  by  the  (…)  use  of  anti-
dumping measures”, as claimed by India in a WTO communication (1999). It is probably 
no coincidence that this statement comes from the country whose trade gains have been 
neutralized most by the subsequent use of AD. 
 
These conclusions are even more worrisome given the recent proliferation of AD 
regimes and the possibility that the list of active AD users will soon expand substantially. 
In this respect, this paper casts a new light on AD and its use, and shows that AD is less 
innocuous than its advocates would like us to believe.   24  
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(i.e., after 1980)  New tough users  New weak users 
Notes: i) Traditional tough users are defined as those countries that often used their AD laws before 
1980 (i.e. Australia, Canada, EU, New Zealand, US); See also Prusa (2001); ii) Traditional weak users 
are all other countries with an AD law adopted before 1980; iii) New tough users are defined as those 
countries where the sum of total initiations and total measures over the period 1980-2000 is at least 
50% higher than for other new users (see Table 2). 
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Table 2: Global adoption and use of AD laws (1980-2000) 
Country 
Year of AD 
law adoption 
(1) 
Total AD initiations 
 
(2) 










Traditional tough users           
    Australia  1906  829  340  39.48  1,290 
    Canada  1904  478  279  22.76  250 
    EU  1968  784  578  37.33  109 
    New Zealand  1921  85  41  4.05  630 
    United States  1916  856  508  40.76  100 
Traditional weak users           
    Argentina  1972  201  91  9.57  1,417 
    Austria  1971  9  0  0.00  26 
    Barbados  1959  0  0  0.00  0 
    Cyprus  1956  0  0  0.00  0 
    Finland  1958  16  11  1.07  86 
    Jamaica  1959  1  1  0.05  34 
    Japan  1920  10  5  0.48  3 
    Malaysia  1959  15  10  0.71  45 
    Norway  1954  0  0  0.00  0 
    South Africa  1914  230  118  10.95  1,406 
    South Korea  1963  66  43  3.14  67 
    Uruguay  1980  3  0  0.15  191 
New tough users           
    Brazil  1987  143  71  9.53  381 
    India  1985  192  138  11.29  578 
    Mexico  1986  180  112  12.00  226 
    Taiwan  1984  73  20  4.29  96 
    Turkey  1989  94  49  7.83  344 
New weak users           
    Albania  1999  0  0  0.00  0 
    Bolivia  1992  0  0  0.00  0 
    Bulgaria  1993  0  0  0.00  0 
    Chile  1986  17  7  1.13  197 
    China  1997  22  9  5.50  50 
    Columbia  1990  27  15  2.45  337 
    Costa Rica  1996  6  1  1.20  277 
    Croatia  1999  0  0  0.00  0 
    Czech Republic  1997  3  1  0.75  29 
    Ecuador  1991  1  0  0.10  59 
    Egypt  1998  25  17  5.00  510 
    El Salvador  1995  0  0  0.00  0 
    Fiji  1998  0  0  0.00  0 
    Guatemala  1996  1  1  0.20  62 
    Honduras  1995  0  0  0.00  0 
    Hungary  1994  0  0  0.00  0 
    Iceland  1987  0  0  0.00  0 
    Israel  1991  25  12  2.50  176 
    Latvia  2000  0  0  0.00  0 
    Lithuania  1998  14  0  4.66  1,267 
    Morocco  1997  0  0  0.00  0 
    Panama  1996  2  0  0.4  160 
    Paraguay  1996  2  1  0.4  231 
    Peru  1991  36  15  3.60  699 
    Philippines  1994  19  12  2.71  128 
    Poland  1997  28  7  4.67  181 
    Romania  1992  0  0  0.00  0 
    Russia  1998  2  0  0.66  32 
    Singapore  1985  2  2  0.13  2 
    Slovak Republic  1997  0  0  0.00  0 
    Slovenia  1993  1  0  0.12  23 
    Spain  1982  1  1  0.25  8 
    Thailand  1994  7  6  1.00  23 
    Trinidad and Tobago  1992  8  4  0.88  698 
    Tunisia  1994  0  0  0.00  0 
    Venezuela  1992  31  20  3.10  351 
Notes: i) Intensity is calculated by dividing total initiations per year by the average value of imports per year and then normalizing the 
index of the US to 100 and expressing all countries relative to the US. 
Sources: Zanardi (2004a and forthcoming).   26  
Table 3: Global trade effects of adopting and using AD laws in new users 
  All exports to new users  Exports of tough users 
 to new users 



















       
















Total AD initiationsjt-1 
-0.021** 
(0.010)           
      Total AD initjt-1 weak      -0.023 
(0.016) 
  -0.002 
(0.013) 
 
      Total AD initjt-1 tough      -0.012 
(0.014) 
  -0.005 
(0.010) 
 
Total AD measuresjt    -0.037*** 
(0.011) 
       
       Total AD measjt weak        -0.029* 
(0.018) 
  -0.021 
(0.013) 
       Total AD measjt tough        -0.039*** 
(0.015) 






























































































































































2  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.91  0.91 
F  1,929.16***  1,925.65***  1,910.20***  1,906.78***  2,127.66***  2,137.32*** 
Observations  33,404  33,222  33,404  33,222  11,858  11,769 
Notes: i) All variables, except dummies, are in logs; ii) Importer and exporter fixed effects as well as year dummies included in all 
specifications; iii) Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% level; iv) In 
these regressions, real exportsijt-1 are instrumented with a two-period lagged value of the exports; v) Total AD initiations refer to initiations 
against all other countries lagged by one year; vi) Total AD measures refer to measures against all other countries.    27  
Table 4: Global trade effects of existing AD laws in traditional users 
  All exports to traditional 
tough users 
Exports of tough users to 
traditional tough users 
All exports to traditional 
weak users 



























Total AD initiationsjt-1 
-0.009 
(0.024)    -0.014 
(0.0005)    -0.042* 
(.026)   
Total AD measuresjt    -0.003 
(0.018) 
  -0.017* 
(0.011) 













































































































































2  0.95  0.95  0.99  0.99  0.91  0.91 
F  2,357.95***  2,358.86***  4,749.47***  4,732.92***  1,099.34***  1,131.44*** 
Observations  7,207  7,207  1,680  1,680  8,965  9,257 
Notes: i) All variables, except dummies, are in logs; ii) Importer and exporter fixed effects as well as year dummies included in all 
specifications; iii) Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% level; iv) In 
these regressions, real exportsijt-1 are instrumented with a two-period lagged value of the exports; v) Total AD initiations refer to initiations 
against all other countries lagged by one year; vi) Total AD measures refer to measures against all other countries.    28  
Table 5: Robustness check: Arellano-Bover (system GMM) 
  Exports to new users  Exports to traditional users 
Exporters  All  All  Tough users  All  Tough users  All 



























AD adoptionjt  -0.008 
(0.030) 
         




     




     
Total AD measuresjt  -0.128*** 
(0.020) 










     
      Total AD measjt tough    -0.145*** 
(0.025) 
-0.080*** 


































































































     
Hansen test
  1,063.73***  1,024.44***  749.41***  560.51  87.47  706.22 
AR1  -23.51***  -23.66***  -12.08***  -7.77***  -4.02***  -11.14*** 
AR2  2.34**  2.44**  2.78***  1.82*  0.42  0.66 
F  184.05***  183.94***  41.76***  448.88***  21,212.71***  97.72*** 
Observations  37,030  37,030  12,489  7,863  1,772  10,135 
Notes: i)  All variables, except dummies, are in logs; ii) Year dummies included in all specifications; iii) Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% level; iii) Total AD measures refer to measures against all 
other countries; iv) In these regressions, real exportsijjt-1, both real GDPt and AD measuresjt are instrumented with ten lags of these variables 
(eight lags in columns (2) and (3) because of computational constraints); v) The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions; 5) AR1 
and AR2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation.   29  
Table 6: Robustness check: GATT/WTO and definition of new tough users 
  All exports to new users 
  WTO effect?  Different definitions of new users 






















































































































































  0.41       
R
2  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.89 
F  1,918.15***  1,907.76***  1,906.22***  2,051.12*** 
Observations  33,222  33,222  33,222  35,452 
Notes: a) Tough new users defined as new users that initiated on average four AD cases per year; b) Tough 
new users defined as new users with an AD intensity index higher than 300; c) Tough new users defined as 
for previous tables plus Argentina, South Africa and South Korea; i) All variables, except dummies, are in 
logs; ii) Importer and exporter fixed effects as well as year dummies included in all specifications; iii) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% 
level;  iv)  In  these  regressions,  real  exportsijt-1  are  instrumented  with  a  two-period  lagged  value  of  the 
exports; v) Total AD initiations refer to initiations against all other countries lagged by one year; vi) Total 
AD measures refer to measures against all other countries.   30  
Table 7: Are gains from trade liberalization offset by AD measures? 



















%' in annual 


















           
  Brazil  1988   1989  -6.7%  23.0%  -3.28  11.27 
  India  1991  1993  -7.8%  11.9%  -2.11  3.21 
  Mexico  1985  1987  -8.2%  18.9%  -7.38  17.01 
  Taiwan  1986  1986  -2.7%  3.4%  -1.46  1.84 
  Turkey  1980  1990  -6.1%  34.3%  -1.46  8.23 




           
  China  1992  1999  -3.1%  9.3%  -4.74  14.14 
  Egypt  1991  1998  -5.5%  21.1%  -0.75  2.87 
  Venezuela  1989  1994  -3.1%  4.0%  -0.38  0.49 
             
Other recent 
frequent users: 
           
  Argentina  1988  1995
ii  -10.5%  30.1%  -2.31  6.62 
  South Africa  1990  1995
ii  -11.9%  5.2%  -2.50  1.08 
  South Korea  1981  1987
ii  -6.4%  5.6%  -6.53  5.68 
Notes: i) New weak users are included in this table if they have an average of at least two AD measures imposed during the sample; ii) 
First year given the available data, which cover a period shorter than the sample; ii) Trade liberalization episodes from Jonsson and 
Subramanian (2001), Li (2004), Liu (2002) and Refaat (2000); iii) Percentage changes calculated using the coefficients from column (4) of 
Table 3 for new users and from column (4) of Table 6 for other recent frequent users; iv) Figures in columns (5) and (6) are in 1995 real 







1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Traditional tough users All other users
Figure 1: Intensity of AD initiations by group of users (1980-2000) 
Notes: i) Intensities calculated by dividing the total number of initiations against group of countries by the number 
of countries in each group. 
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AD law, by year GATT/WTO member, by year  32  
Data appendix: sources 
 
Variables  Description  Sources 
AD dummy  Dummy variable equals 1 in the year when a country has an AD law  Zanardi  (2004a) 
AD initiations  The number of AD initiations in a particular year against all other countries  Zanardi  (2004a) 
AD measures  The number of AD measures in a particular year against all other countries  Zanardi  (2004a) 
AD age  The number of years since an AD law was adopted  Zanardi  (2004a) 
Border  Dummy variable equal to 1 when countries share a land border  CIA World Factbook 
Colony  Dummy variable equal to 1 when countries had colonial ties  CIA World Factbook 
Distance  Great circle distance in km between capitals  Author’s calculation 
Openness index  Freedom to Trade with Foreigners index from the Economic Freedom Index  Fraser Institute, Canada 
Exports  Real value of exports deflated by US GDP deflator  International Financial Statistics  (IFS) and CHELEM
 
GDP  Real value of GDP deflated by US GDP deflator  IFS and CHELEM 
Language  Dummy variable equal to 1 when countries share an official language  CIA World Factbook 
Population  Population in millions   IFS and CHELEM 
RER  Real exchange rate  IFS and CHELEM 
RTA  Regional Trade Agreements: EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, U.S-Israel, EEA, CEFTA, 
EFTA, COMESA, Australia-New Zealand  WTO 
WTO  Dummy variable equal to 1 in the years a country is member of the GATT/WTO  WTO 
Notes: CHELEM: This dataset is made available by CEPII, Paris, France.   33   
Data appendix: list of countries in the dataset 
Albania  Dominica*  Latvia  Slovak Republic 
Algeria*  Dominican Republic  Lebanon*  Slovenia 
Antigua and Barbuda*  Ecuador  Libya*  South Africa 
Argentina  European Union**  Lithuania  South Korea 
Aruba*  Egypt  Luxemburg*  Spain 
Australia  El Salvador  Macao*  Sri Lanka 
Austria  Equatorial Guinea*  Macedonia, FYR*  St. Kitts and Nevis* 
Bahamas*  Estonia  Malaysia  St. Lucia* 
Bahrain  Fiji  Maldives*  St. Vincent and Grenadines* 
Barbados  Finland  Malta  Suriname* 
Belarus*  France*  Mauritius  Sweden* 
Belgium*  Gabon*  Mexico  Switzerland 
Belize*  Germany*  Morocco  Syrian Arab Republic* 
Bermuda*  Greece  Netherlands*  Taiwan, Province of China 
Bolivia  Grenada*  Netherlands Antilles*  Thailand 
Bosnia and Herzegovina*  Guatemala  New Zealand  Tonga* 
Brazil  Guyana*  Norway  Trinidad and Tobago 
Brunei Darussalam*  Honduras  Oman  Tunisia 
Bulgaria  Hungary  Panama  Turkey 
Canada  Iceland  Papua New Guinea  Turkmenistan* 
Cape Verde*  India  Paraguay  United Arab Emirates 
Chile  Iran*  Peru  United Kingdom* 
China  Iraq*  Philippines  United States 
China, Hong Kong  Ireland*  Poland  Uruguay 
Colombia  Israel  Portugal  Vanuatu* 
Costa Rica  Italy*  Qatar*  Venezuela 
Croatia  Jamaica  Romania   
Cuba*  Japan  Russia   
Cyprus  Jordan  Samoa*   
Czech Republic  Kazakhstan*  Saudi Arabia*   
Denmark*  Kiribati*  Seychelles*   
Djibouti*  Kuwait*  Singapore   
Notes: i) A * means that the country is included only as an exporter because of data limitation (especially the economic freedom index) 
to allow its inclusion as an importer; individual EU countries are not included as importers since the EU is included as a single importing 
entity; ii) A ** means that the country is only included as an importer.   34   
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